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THE PLIGHT OF THE HANDICAPPED INFANT: THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE
William C. Mimst

INTRODUCTION

I.

The starvation death in April, 1982, of a Bloomington, Indiana infant afflicted with Down's syndrome,l esophageal atresia,2 and related
medical conditions sparked a nationwide debate concerning the federal
government's role in protecting handicapped infants. 3 The debate has
been fueled by reports of other handicapped newborns dying after treatment or nourishment was withheld4 and by simmering passions that extend beyond the facts of a particular "Infant Doe"5 case. The debate
centers on three issues: 1) the tension between an infant's due process
right to life and his parents' constitutional right of privacy to make medi-

t
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

A.B., College of William & Mary, 1979; J.D., The National Law Center, George
Washington University, 1984; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1986,
candidate for M.A., College of William & Mary. The author is employed by the
United States House of Representatives.
Down's syndrome (or mongolism) is a chromosonal disorder producing mental retardation. Down's syndrome is caused by the presence of 47 chromosomes, rather
than the normal 46, in a person's cells. A person afHicted with Down's syndrome
characteristically has a distinctively shaped head, neck, trunk, and abdomen. I J.
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER D-107
(1985) [hereinafter cited as I J. SCHMIDT]; J. WARKANY, CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 311-12, 316, 324, 327 (1971) [hereinafter cited as J. WARKANY].
Esophageal atresia is a congenital absence or blockage of the esophagus, which frequently is correctable with surgery. I J. SCHMIDT, supra note I, at A-365; 2 J.
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER E-113
(1985) [hereinafter cited as 2 J. SCHMIDT]; J. WARKANY, supra note I, at 678-83.
In re Guardianship of Infant Doe, No. 1-782A 157 (Ind. Feb. 3, 1983) (appeal dismissed) (files sealed by order of the court).
A 1983 article in the journal Pediatrics describes how five pediatricians at Oklahoma
Children's Memorial Hospital selected 24 spina bifida patients for "non treatment"
based upon a mathematical equation that factored the "economic and intellectual
resources" of the infants' parents, the availability of medical resources, and the infants' medical conditions. Gross, Early Management and Decision Making for the
Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 PEDIATRICS 450 (1983); see also Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act Amendments of 1983: Hearings
on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Family and Human Services of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1983) (statements of Senators Denton and Nickles referring to a documentary on WNEV-TV in
Boston that presented evidence of treatment being withheld from approximately 100
infants) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; id. at 172-89 (additional case documentation); Mathematical Formula Decides Life and Death, The Washington
Times, July 10, 1984, at lA, col. 1; HHS Beats Retreat on Newborn Rights, The
Washington Times, July 12, 1984, at lA, col. 1 (reporting allegation that as many as
65 handicapped infants may have died from nontreatment at Yale-New Haven Medical School and affiliated hospitals). For reports on preventable deaths prior to 1981,
see Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1975).
"Infant Doe" refers to those infants whose names have been withheld from various
publications, and handicapped infants generally who have not received treatment or
nourishment.
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cal treatment decisions for the child; 2) whether the quality of the infant's life should be a factor in medical treatment decisions; and 3) the
extent to which the government should become involved in the decision
concerning choice of medical treatment.
Prior to newspaper publication of the 1982 Infant Doe case, 6 there
was little federal activity specifically dealing with the decision to treat
severely handicapped infants.7 Rather, treatment decisions were viewed
as a private matter between physicians and parents. State child abuse
and neglect doctrines 8 and an American Medical Association (AMA) advisory opinion provided the principal sources of guidance to physicians
dealing with Infant Doe cases. 9 The AMA opinion stated that the parents' decision regarding treatment should be respected by the physician
unless there is convincing evidence that the parents are not acting in the
best interest of the infant. to This AMA guideline was criticized following Infant Doe's death from starvation because it stipulated that the best
interests of the child might be served by a decision not to "exert maximal
efforts to sustain life."
The Infant Doe debate in 1982 raised public concern as to whether
the AMA position sufficiently protects the infant's interests and whether
the federal government should have a role in treatment decisions. These
issues have caused a split of opinion within the medical community. The
majority of medical organizations do not oppose limited federal oversight
of treatment decisions. I I The AMA, however, steadfastly opposes any
6. See, e.g., Washington Post, Apr. 16, 1982 at A16, col.1.
7. For example, in 1980, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) applied section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when a hospital withheld surgery to correct an intestinal blockage from a Down's syndrome child. See
48 Fed. Reg. 30,847-48 (1980).
8. See Comment, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 569, 571-81 (1983). Every
state has child protective services agencies that investigate child abuse and neglect
reports. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340).
9. AMA Judicial Council Op. 2.14 (1984) states that:
In desparate situations involving newborns, the advice and judgment of
the physician should be readily available, but the decision whether to exert
maximal efforts to sustain life should be the choice of the parents. The
parents should be told the options, expected benefits, risks and limits of
any proposed care; how the potential for human relationships is affected
by the infant's condition; and relevant information and answers to their
questions. The presumption is that the love which parents usually have
for their children will be dominant in the decisions which they make in
determining what is in the best interest of their children. It is to be expected that parents will act unselfishly, particularly where life itself is at
stake. Unless there is convincing evidence to the contrary, parental authority should be respected.
Id.
IO.Id.
11. Most major medical professional organizations supported the final version of the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. For a complete listing of organizations endorsing the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, see 130 CONGo REC. 58,952 (daily ed.
July 20, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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degree of federal involvement in treatment decisions,12 In addition, the
stance taken by the medical community that the decision of whether to
treat a severely handicapped infant is essentially a private matter for physicians and the parents is opposed vehemently by a coalition of handicapped advocacy, civil rights, and pro-life organizations. The coalition
contends that an infant's due process right to life is paramount to all
other concerns and the coalition supports intervention by the federal government in instances where life-sustaining treatment is withheld.
During the past four years, the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the federal government have become involved in the development of national policy pertaining to the rights of severely handicapped
infants. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) attempted to protect handicapped newborns under the authority of an existing civil rights statute, section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,13 but this effort was rebuffed by the federal courtS.14 In
addition, Congress has enacted the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,15
which authorize the withholding of certain federal monetary grants from
states that do not promulgate and enforce procedures to protect handicapped infants.
This article examines the issues involved in the current debate
within the framework of a discussion and analysis of actions undertaken
by HHS, Congress, and the federal jUdiciary. The article provides an
overview of the HHS response under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 following the first widely publicized Infant Doe case and the judicial reaction to HHS actions. The article also examines the development of the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and HHS regulations implementing
the amendments. Finally, the article explores constitutional due process
and privacy interests that may be affected by governmental action in Infant Doe cases.

12. The AMA declined to endorse the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and was a
party to American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd
sub nom. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), which invalidated 45 C.F.R. 84.
13. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1982). The nondiscrimination language of section 504 provides:
"No otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
.... " Id.
14. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), aff'g American Hosp.
Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. University
Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d CiT. 1984);
American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
15. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984); see
infra notes 137-62 and accompanying text.
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HHS RESPONSE UNDER SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 AND JUDICIAL
REACTION

A.

The Initial HHS Response

[Vol. 15

Following the publication of newspaper articles about the death of
the Bloomington, Indiana Infant Doe in April, 1982, handicapped and
pro-life advocacy groups urged the Reagan Administration and Congress
to enact preventative measures for the protection of handicapped infants.
On April 30, 1982, President Reagan responded by directing HHS Secretary Richard Schweiker and Attorney General William French Smith to
apply section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 16 to prohibit hospitals and other health service providers receiving federal assistance from
denying handicapped individuals any benefit or service that ordinarily is
provided to nonhandicapped individuals. 17 Section 504 broadly prohibits
discrimination against handicapped individuals. Section 504 provides:
"No otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 18
In response to the President's directive, HHS notified health care
providers receiving federal financial assistance that existing section 504
regulations 19 would be interpreted to prohibit the withholding of food
and medical or surgical treatment necessary to correct a life-threatening
condition if: (1) the nutrition or treatment would be withheld because the
patient was afflicted with a handicap; and (2) the handicap would not
render the nutrition or treatment medically contraindicated. 20 Following
dissemination of the HHS notice, the HHS Office of Civil Rights began
to investigate complaints of discrimination against handicapped infants
and to review the neonatal intensive care procedures of several major
hospitals. 21 As part of the HHS investigation, investigators interviewed
affected parties, contacted state and local agencies, and examined medical and legal documents. 22
In addition, on March 7, 1983, HHS published an Interim Final
Rule 23 pursuant to the rulemaking provision of section 504.24 The Interim Final Rule was designed to assist HHS in identifying handicapped
16. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
17. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 11 (statement of Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon
General of the United States).
18. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
19. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.30), 84.52 (1985).
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
21. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 28 (statement of Betty Lou Dotson, Director
of the Office of Civil Rights, HHS).
22.Id.
23. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 provides for rulemaking to implement the statute: "The head of
each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry
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infants who were being denied nutrition and medical care and to enhance
HHS's access to the facilities and records of health care providers. 25 The
primary provisions of the Interim Final Rule set out the following measures: (1) the posting of prominent notices in each health care facility
stating that the failure to feed and care for handicapped infants is prohibited by federal law;26 (2) the establishment of a twenty-four hour a day
telephone hotline that any individual could use to report incidents of severely handicapped infants being denied food or medical treatment;27
and (3) the issuance of a statement that access to records and facilities of
health care providers would not be limited to normal business hours
when immediate access is necessary to protect the life or health of a
handicapped individual. 28

B.

American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler

Publication of the HHS Interim Final Rule was met by protests
from medical groups decrying federal involvement in Infant Doe cases,29
and the rule immediately was challenged in federal court. Within weeks,
the rule was struck down by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler.30
The court determined that the HHS rule violated the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,31 because the rule was apout the Amendments to this Section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978."
25. See 48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631 (1983) for the full text of the notice.
26.Id.
27. Id. at 9631-32.
28.Id.
29. Four arguments have been advanced by critics of the HHS action and subsequent
federal supervisory efforts. First, most of the protesting doctors argued that treatment decisions are a private matter between physician and patient. See To Amend
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Education and Labor
Comm., lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1983) (statement of AMA) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
We oppose ... governmental interference into medical treatment decisions
for handicapped infants.... We believe that unless there is convincing
evidence that the parents are not acting in the interest of the child, the
parents should decide what medical treatment their child will receive. We
cannot support efforts that will result in the government second-guessing
these parental decisions made in consultation with their physician.
Id. But cj, 'Baby Doe': It's Not a 'Medical' Question, Washington Post, Apr. 17,
1983 at D7, col. 1. Second, the regulation and supervision of medical and treatment
decisions traditionally have resided at the state and local level under our federal
system. Third, the HHS approach (utilizing a 24-hour "hotline" and investigative
teams that initially might not be familiar with all aspects of the case) was overly
intrusive. Fourth, treatment of severely handicapped infants diverted scarce resources that could be used to treat infants who were more likely to survive and
improve. See Lying Hopelessly Ill, Infant Tests New Law of Hospital Survival,
Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1983 at A4, col. 3.
30. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
31. 5 U.S.c. § 553 (1982).
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proved without the requisite notice and public comment. 32 In addition,
the court found that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because HHS
failed to consider several substantive factors during the rulemaking process. 33 Specifically, HHS did not consider the potentially disruptive effect of the hotline calls and investigations on the continuing treatment of
infants.34 In addition, the court believed that HHS should have considered the advantages and disadvantages of relying on the wishes of parents
in light of the forecasted quality of an infant's life. 35 Finally, the court
noted that HHS did not consider funding sources for the extensive care
mandated by the regulation,36 nor did HHS review alternative means of
protection, particularly those suggested by the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behaviorial Research. 37

C.

The Second HHS Rule

HHS redrafted the rule and incorporated substantive modifications
sufficient to quell the protests that had surrounded the earlier effort. 38
The new rule addressed the two major substantive problems identified by
32. 561 F. Supp. at 398-401. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b),(d)
(1982) requires general notice of proposed rulemaking at least thirty days before the
effective date of the substantive Rules:
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.
The notice shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of public rulemaking proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal
authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or
substance of the subjects and issues involved[.]
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be
made not less than 30 days before its effective date ....
33. 561 F. Supp. at 399-400. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A)
(1982) requires the reviewing court to set aside agency action not in accordance
with the law:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall -

34.
35.

36.
37.

38.

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law;
561 F. Supp. at 399.
/d. at 400.
[d.
[d. The American Academy of Pediatrics court referred to REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT].
Within 90 days of Judge Gesell's order in American Academy of Pediatrics, HHS
published a proposed rule. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983). Following extensive com-
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the district court in American Academy of Pediatrics. First, the rule attempted to ameliorate the potentially disruptive effects of hotline calls by
restricting the posting of hotline notices to locations where the notices
are visible virtually exclusively to physicians and nurses. 39 Second, the
rule also supported the principal recommendation of the President's
Commission for an alternative means of protecting severely handicapped
infants by providing for the creation of permanent Infant Care Review
Committees (ICRCs) in each hospital. 40
HHS envisioned ICRCs serving several functions. The ICRCs were
designed to act as a buffer between physicians and parents and the federal
government. HHS intended to rely upon the ICRCs as an investigative
organ whenever hotline complaints were registered, thereby reducing the
number of on-site federal inspections. 41 In addition, HHS contemplated
that each hospital's ICRC would develop and implement policies and
procedures regarding the administration of treatment to severely handicapped infants.42 Furthermore, in individual cases, ICRCs would function as a panel of experts reviewing treatment decisions. 43 The suggested
medically expert composition of the ICRCs served to quiet criticism that
federal officials sought to interfere with the physician-patient
relationship.44
In addition to requiring the posting of informational notices and encouraging the establishment of ICRCs, the rule facilitated HHS access to
hospital records, provided for expedited judicial action,45 and required

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.

45.

ment, the final rule was published on January 12, 1984 with an effective date of
February 13, 1984. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1984).
45 c.F.R. § 84.55(b)(2) (1984). The initial rule proposed by HHS required the posting of a hotline notice in a conspicious location in each delivery ward, maternity
ward, pediatric ward, and nursery of all hospitals receiving federal funds.
45 c.F.R. § 84.55(a) (1984); see FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra
note 37, at 223-29.
45 C.F.R. § 84.61 App. C (b) (1984).
Id. § 84.55(f)(3)(i) (1984). The HHS guidelines also list specific instances where
withholding treatment from handicapped infants would not violate section 504. Id.
at § 84.61 App. C. Treatment for anencephaly, spina bifida, and severe prematurity
and low birth weight may be withheld if the decision is based on reasonable medical
judgment that treatment would be futile or unlikely of success given complications,
would create risks of potential harm to the infant, or merely would prolong the act
of dying. Id. The listing of specific instances where treatment may be withheld
clarified HHS's response to comments that treatment was not required if it would
only postpone imminent or certain death. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 3536. Dr. Koop, the Surgeon General of the United States, commented that the HHS
regulations were not intended to usurp a physician's perogative:
[Slome children are born dying and others face death a little bit further
down the road. It is absolutely not this Department's intention to formulate any regulations which would interfere with a physician's understanding of the difference between giving a patient a life to which he is entitled,
as opposed to prolonging his act of dying.
Id.
45 C.P.R. § 84.55(f)(3)(ii) (1984).
Id. § 84.55(f)(2) (1984).
Id. § 84.55(d)-(e) (1984).
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state child protective services agencies to establish procedures under state
law to protect handicapped infants.46 Moreover, the rule incorporated
four interpretive guidelines to provide additional direction to health care
providers. 47 First, health care providers were prohibited from withholding treatment or nourishment that would medically benefit a handicapped infant. 48 Second, treatment that would do no more than
temporarily prolong the act of dying was not deemed medically beneficia1. 49 Third, in determining whether treatment would be medically beneficial, reasonable medical decisions in selecting among alternative
courses of treatment would be respected. 50 Fourth, when the parents of a
severely handicapped infant refuse medically indicated treatment, the
hospital must report the parents' refusal to the state child protective services agency or must pursue judicial action to protect the infant.51
The rule and the interpretive guidelines requiring the reporting of
Infant Doe cases to state child protective services reflect a dilemma that
HHS confronted when it first began its enforcement efforts. 52 Section
504 contains provisions that expressly limit its application to recipients of
federal financial assistance, a category that includes most hospitals. It is
usually the parents, however, in consultation with a physician, who make
the decision to withhold medical treatment from a handicapped infant. 53
HHS recognized that section 504 could be used to prevent hospitals and
their staff physicians from recommending the withholding of treatment,
but more problematic was whether section 504 could be interpreted to
preempt state common law doctrines that reserve for parents sole discretion to approve treatment for their minor children. 54 HHS solved this
dilemma by requiring hospital officials to notify state authorities whenever medical care or nourishment was withheld. 55 Thus, HHS applied
section 504 directly to prevent hospitals from withholding treatment or
advocating the withholding of treatment. In the event that parents decided to withhold treatment, HHS interpreted section 504 as requiring
the hospital and its staff to follow appropriate state procedures to protect
the infant's interests.
[d. § 84.55(c) (1984).
[d. § 84.61 App. C (1984).
[d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(I) (1984).
[d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(2) (1984).
[d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(3) (1984).
[d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(4) (1984).
The emphasis in the rule and interpretive guidelines also reflects the HHS position
that state enforcement action will be less controversial than federal enforcement
action. "For those complaints that are expeditiously and effectively investigated
and pursued by State agencies, the Secretary anticipates that additional federal efforts often will be unnecessary." 48 Fed. Reg. 30,849 (1983).
53. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 & 14,880 (1985) (to be codified at 45 c.F.R. 1340).
54. For a discussion of the treatment accorded this issue by the Supreme Court in
Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), see infra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text.
55. Notification to state authorities generally is required by state law. See 49 Fed. Reg.
1630, 1631 (1984).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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United States v. University Hospital, State University of New York
at Stony Brook

Within days after the new rule took effect, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. University Hospital, State University of New York at Stony Brook 56 that section 504 does
not apply to medical treatment decisions. University Hospital arose when
the parents of an infant with spina bifida,57 microcephaly, 58 and
hydrocephalus, 59 declined surgery that could have prolonged the infant's
life. 60 The infant's parents, however, did not request physicians to end
the provision of nutrition and antibiotics to the infant. 6\ HHS requested
access to the infant's medical records to determine whether the decision
to forego surgery was based entirely on a handicapping condition and
thus violative of section 504. 62
The hospital refused HHS's request for the records, and the Justice
Department initiated judicial action to compel production. 63 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled for the
hospital on summary judgment. 64 The court found no evidence of discrimination by the hospital because, in the absence of parental consent,
the hospital lacked the legal right to perform surgery.65
A divided three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling. Moreover, the
court of appeals declared that there was no basis in section 504 for HHS
56. 729 F.2d 144, 157-60 (2d Cir. 1984). The new rule became effective on February
13, 1984. On February 23, 1984, the Second Circuit held section 504 inapplicable to
Infant Doe situations.
57. Spina bifida is a congenital defect in the development of the spine that leaves the
vertebral canal exposed outside the body at some point and frequently results in
partial or total paralysis of the lower extremities. Mental retardation also may occur if bacteria entering the exposed vertebral canal causes an infection in the central
nervous system. The vertebral canal opening usually can be closed surgically, and
the child's prognosis generally depends upon how quickly surgery is performed after
birth. See 3 I. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD
FINDER S-I40 (1985); I. WARKANY, supra note 1, at 272-75; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 61-80 (statement of David G. McLone, MD, regarding the
positive results of pursuing early surgery and aggressive treatment for spina bifida
infants).
58. Microcephaly is a congenital defect that causes an infant to have an abnormally
small head and brain. Microcephaly usually results in severe mental retardation.
See 2 I. SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at M-102; I. WARKANY, supra note 1, at 237-38.
59. Hydrocephalus is a condition marked by an abnormal increase in the fluid that nor.
mally is present in and around the brain. This condition usually results in mental
retardation. See 2 I. SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at H-102; I. WARKANY, supra note 1,
at 217-18.
60. 729 F.2d at 146.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 147.
63. Id. at 148.
64. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 575 F.
Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 614.
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actions to protect handicapped infants.66 Relying primarily on Southeastern Community College v. Davis 67 and Doe v. New York University,68 the
court reasoned that although the infant was a handicapped individual
under section 504,69 the infant was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504 and therefore was not protected from discrimination by the statute. 70 The court stated that section 504 was intended to prohibit
discrimination against handicapped individuals whose handicaps are unrelated to the medical services sought to be withheld. 7) Consequently,
according to the court, the phrase "otherwise qualified" cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions
without distorting its plain meaning. 72
The University Hospital court also reasoned that even if a handicapped infant were otherwise qualified, the denial of treatment would not
be discriminatory under section 504. 73 According to the court, when the
handicapping condition is related to the infirmity to be treated, rarely
will it be possible to conclude with certainty that a particular treatment
decision has been discriminatory.74 Lengthy litigation primarily involving conflicting expert testimony would be necessary to determine
whether the decision to administer treatment is based on a bona fide
medical judgment. 75 The court buttressed its holding by noting that the
legislative history of section 504 indicated the section is applicable principally in a vocational context; Congress did not consider the application
of section 504 to medical questions. 76
Judge Winter vigorously dissented from the majority opinion. He
found that section 504 "states with as much clarity as is reasonably possible that in some circumstances recipients of federal financial assistance
may not differentiate between individuals on grounds that one or more is
handicapped."77 Judge Winter therefore concluded that the majority's
consideration of legislative history was improper because courts should
examine legislative history only when the statutory language is unclear.7 8
Judge Winter also pointed out that section 504 is patterned after,
and virtually identical to, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,79
66. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729
F.2d 144, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1984).
67. 442 U.S. 397 (1979); see infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
68.666 F.2d 761 (1981); see infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
69. 729 F.2d at 155.
70. Id. at 156.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. /d. at 157.
74.Id.
75. /d.
76. Id. at 157-58.
77. Id. at 161 (Winter, J., dissenting).
78.Id.
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000d (1964). That section states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
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and thus should not be read more narrowly than section 601. 80 A decision to refuse treatment to a person because of his race is not a bona fide
medical judgment under section 601. 81 Section 504 entitles the government to inquire whether a particular medical decision is bona fide: the
same type of inquiry the government is entitled to make under section
601. 82 Judge Winter reasoned that the determination of what constitutes
a bona fide medical judgment under section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act should parallel a like determination under section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act. Accordingly, a decision not to correct a life-threatening digestive problem because an infant has Down's syndrome is not a
bona fide medical judgment. 83

E.

Bowen v. American Hospital Association

The University Hospital decision was relied upon by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to declare
the HHS rule invalid as outside the statutory authority granted the department by section 504. The decision, American Hospital Association v.
Heckler,84 subsequently was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the decision as Bowen v. American
Hospital Association ,85 and on June 9, 1986, the Court upheld the Second
Circuit decision by determining that the rulemaking was beyond the
scope of HHS authority. 86
The issues involved in University Hospital present difficult questions
regarding legislative intent and statutory construction. Because Bowen v.
American Hospital Association is based principally on procedural
grounds, these issues merit further analysis. Specifically, a determination
must be made as to whether in enacting section 504 Congress intended to
create a statute broad enough to include situations that were not enunciated specifically during debate over the bill and to include all federallyassisted programs. In light of the University Hospital analysis, consideration also must be given to whether the phrase "otherwise qualified,"
which limited the scope of the original 1973 Act to the employment and
vocational rehabilitation contexts,87 limits the applicability of section
504 in Infant Doe cases.
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." Id.
80. University Hasp., 729 F.2d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82.Id.
83. /d.
84. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
85. 105 S. Ct. 3975 (1985).
86. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
87. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3739, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 6373, 6388, 6390.
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In their attempts to discern the legislative intent underlying section
504, lower courts have relied principally on the lack of a clear statement
by Congress that section 504 applies to situations involving the medical
treatment of handicapped infants.88 Prior to 1978, the year in which the
Rehabilitation Act was last amended, congressional attention was not focused on Infant Doe cases. It is recognized as a matter of statutory construction, however, that every conceivable application of a statute need
not be considered in order to give the statute its intended effect.89 A
proper analysis of section 504 therefore requires an examination as to
whether Congress intended that section 504 apply to situations in the
broad medical context.
1.

Legislative Intent: Section 504 as a Civil Rights Statute

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to implement comprehensive changes in federally-assisted state vocational rehabilitation programs that existed under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act.9o The goals
of the 1973 Act were to encourage employment of the handicapped and
to enhance generally the ability of handicapped persons to function in
society.91 The 1973 Act was a negotiated agreement between Congress
and the Nixon Administration, because President Nixon had vetoed two
previous bills.92 Congressional proponents urged modification of the
1973 Act to implement Congress's desire to prohibit discrimination in all
situations, not just in employment situations.
In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the 1973 Act that substantially expanded the scope of the Act. 93 In 1973, section 504 of the 1973
88. See University Hasp., 729 F.2d 144, 159-60; American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C. 1983).
89. This principle was first expressed by Justice Holmes, in a decision written when he
was a circuit judge:
A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the policy
of the law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases most
likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature has the power to decide what
the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise
of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces
the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you
have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.
Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (emphasis added).
90. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6376.
91. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 2076,2077.
92. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 2076, 2077-78.
93. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 6373, 6376-77; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S.
624, 632 (1984) (acknowledging that a year after enactment of the statute Congress
amended it, clarifying Congress's intent to prohibit other types of discrimination
besides employment discrimination of handicapped individuals).
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Act only applied to handicapped individuals in the context of employment or vocational rehabilitation. The 1974 Amendments expanded the
reach of section 504 to include all handicapped individuals, regardless of
their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation services
with respect to federally aided programs. 94 As amended, section 504 includes statutory language patterned after the antidiscrimination language
of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relating to race, color, or
national origin95 and section 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972
relating to sex. 96 Section 504 reflects Congress's desire to establish a
broad governmental policy that all programs receiving federal financial
assistance be operated without discrimination on the basis of handicap. 97
By intentionally patterning section 504 after section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and section 901 of the Education Amendments of
1972, Congress demonstrated its desire that section 504 be interpreted as
expansively as other federal civil rights statutes. 98 The remarks of Representative Emmanuel Cellar, principal House sponsor of section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, are instructive on the reach of federal civil
rights law in the medical context: "The bill would offer assurance that
hospitals financed by Federal money would not deny adequate care to
Negroes .... It would, in short, assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Federal funds."99 Nothing in the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments to section 504 indicates that section 504
should be given a narrower scope in the medical context than section
601.
2.

The Reach of the "Otherwise Qualified" Limitation

Relying principally on the Supreme Court's decisions in Southeastern Community College v. Davis 100 and its own decision in Doe v. New
94. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6373-74.
95. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS at 6390.
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The significance of the analogy to section
601 was expressed by Judge Winter in his University Hospital dissent when he
pointed out that the decision not to perform surgery because a person is black is
equivalent to the decision not to perform surgery because a person is handicapped.
Judge Winter concluded that neither decision was a bonafide medical judgment and
that both decisions were proscribed by federal law. See supra text accompanying
notes 79-83; United States V. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony
Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting).
97. Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.c. § 1681(a) (1982). That section provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... " Id.
98. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6390.
99. See id.
100. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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York University,101 both of which involved denial to handicapped persons
of admission to educational programs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. University Hospital, State
University of New York at Stony Brook interpreted the phrase "otherwise
qualified" to mean that section 504 only applied to "static" programs or
activities, such as education, employment, and transportation, and not to
the "comparatively fluid" context of medical treatment decisions. 102 To
hold otherwise, the majority concluded, would distort the statute's plain
meaning. 103
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a college could deny a hearing-impaired applicant admission to its nursing program because the applicant would be unable to graduate unless substantial modifications
were made in the instructional program. 104 In finding that the applicant's handicap prevented her from being otherwise qualified, the Court
defined an otherwise qualified individual as one who is able to meet all of
the requirements of a particular program notwithstanding the presence
of a handicap.105 The Court also stated that section 504 does not compel
educational institutions to disregard disabilities of handicapped persons
or to make substantial modifications in instructional programs; rather,
section 504 directs that the "mere possession of a handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particular context."106 In this regard, the Court agreed with HHS that under section
504 an individual who meets all of the requirements for participation in a
federally-assisted program, but lacks a legitimate physical qualification,
such as "a blind person possessing all of the qualifications for driving a
bus except sight," is not protected by section 504.107
Doe v. New York University 108 arose when a former medical student,
who had concealed from New York University admissions officials a history of stress-related psychiatric problems, was denied readmission to the
University's medical school because school officials feared a recurrence of
erratic behavior.109 The Second Circuit, relying upon Davis, upheld the
University's decision denying readmission. The court held that the
phrase "otherwise qualified" permitted consideration of the student's
psychiatric handicap provided it was relevant to reasonable qualifications
for acceptance. 1 10
In deciding University Hospital, the Second Circuit's reliance upon
101. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
102. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729
F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984); see supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
103. 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984).
104. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400-02, 414 (1979).
105. /d. at 406.
106. [d. at 405.
107. [d. at 407.
108. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. [d. at 765-71.
110. [d. at 775.
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Davis was misplaced. In Davis, the Supreme Court's analysis was limited
to the vocational and educational contexts presented by the facts of the
case, contexts which involve specific minimum standards for participation. There is no indication that the Court intended its holding to apply
with equal weight to other contexts, such as transportation, housing, and
health care, where no minimum standards or qualifications bar participation. Davis deals only with the vocational and educational contexts; accordingly, its definition of "otherwise qualified" should be limited to
situations involving merit based standards or minimum qualifications
that generally bar entry to individuals, handicapped or otherwise, who
do not fulfill the threshold requirements.
The novel distinction drawn by the University Hospital court between "static" programs and the "comparatively fluid" context of medical treatment decisions is untenable. The distinction does not provide a
principled basis for determining the relevance of the phrase "otherwise
qualified." Neither the statute nor its legislative history contains language that draws a distinction between static and fluid programs. Instead, the distinction conflicts with the expansive reach that Congress
intended to give the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, because health services
are expressly included within the scope of the Act. Moreover, other existing civil rights laws have been held to encompass medical situations. III
A better distinction would be based on the criteria of exclusive versus nonexclusive programs. This distinction is more useful than that
drawn by the University Hospital court because it does not distort the
plain meaning of the phrase "otherwise qualified." More importantly,
this distinction effectuates the stated congressional intent for a broad
government policy precluding discrimination against handicapped individuals. 112 The critical distinction between the myriad of categories in
section 504 is that some are exclusive in nature, such as those related to
employment and education, whereas others like transportation, housing,
and health services are nonexclusive in nature. Exclusive programs have
eligibility requirements for participation that are independent of handicap, such as prior qualifications, work experience, and predicted or
demonstrated ability to perform the desired tasks. Nonexclusive programs are services that are provided on a broad scale by the federal government for which eligibility is dependent upon need and the availability
of the resource and, in some instances, the ability of the handicapped
individual to pay for the resource. Nonexclusive programs were the principal focus of the 1974 amendments, and the preexisting "otherwise qualIll. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212,230 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 620 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("Health care programs were clearly among those to which ... [section
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] was intended to apply"); National Ass'n for
Advancement of Colored People v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp.
330 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Marable v. Alabama
Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (D. Ala. 1969) (same).
112. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6390.
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ified" limitation has no meaning when applied to nonexclusive programs.
For example, a handicapped person need not be otherwise qualified to
ride a public transit bus or to benefit from medical services.
The distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive programs is
consistent with the Supreme Court's definition in Davis that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." I 13 The distinction recognizes that
there are federally-assisted programs in which there are no requirements
barring participation other than need and availability of the resource.
The federal role in these programs is to guarantee access because of the
handicap rather than in spite of the handicap. In the context of exclusive
programs, such as the nursing program examined in Davis, there are
clear and objective requirements to be "otherwise qualified." If an individual seeking an educational or vocational opportunity has met the minimum eligibility requirements based upon merit, prior experience,
predicted or demonstrated ability to succeed, or other established criteria, then the presence of a handicapping condition will not bar the individual from consideration. Likewise, according to Davis, if an individual
has not achieved these minimum standards for eligibility, the presence of
a handicapping condition does not require substantial special
consideration.
Application of the section 504 protections to nonexclusive programs
is consistent with the Davis formulation. In the context of nonexclusive
programs, an otherwise qualified handicapped individual is one who is
able to meet all of the requirements, if any, for participation in any federally-assisted program in spite of his handicap and who is excluded from
participation, denied benefits, or subjected to discrimination under any
such activity.114 Accordingly, a handicapped infant who seeks medical
treatment must be considered "otherwise qualified" if the treatment
would be beneficial, the hospital offers the treatment required by the infant, and other requirements, such as ability to pay, are met.
The flaw of the University Hospital court's distinction between static
programs and the fluid context of medical treatment is evident when the
University Hospital and Davis analyses are applied to the facts of a recent
Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Baylor University Medical Center. I IS
In Baylor, a Texas hospital prevented HHS from examining records and
interviewing personnel as part of an HHS inquiry to determine whether
the hospital had discriminated against a deaf patient by refusing to allow
her interpreter into the hospital to assist her in understanding preoperative and postoperative discussions with the medical staff. I 16 The court
held that the hospital's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid payments constituted federal financial assistance and thus section 504 was applicable to
113.
114.
115.
116.

Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
See supra note 13.
736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 958 (1985).
!d. at 1041.
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protect the disabled individua1. 1I7 Under Baylor, a disabled individual
would be protected by section 504 whenever a hospital receives federal
funds. Under the reasoning of University Hospital, however, the Texas
hospital would not have violated section 504 merely by refusing to treat
any condition of the deaf patient related to her handicapping condition.
In contrast to the Baylor court, which guaranteed the deaf patient full
and meaningful access to health services as required by section 504,118
the University Hospital court bars the application of section 504 to any
medical treatment decisions after access is secured. The right of access
to medical treatment is of little consequence and the protective capability
of section 504 is without effect if, once a deaf person or handicapped
infant comes through the hospital door, he can be denied treatment
merely because section 504 does not apply to medical treatment decisions. Applying the Davis analysis to the facts of Baylor, the deaf patient
would be otherwise qualified, and therefore able to bring her interpreter
into the hospital, because this activity does not require a substantial modification or disruption of the hospital's policies and procedures. Furthermore, section 504 would require treatment of her handicapping condition
if the necessary treatment normally were available at the hospital and if
she met hospital requirements for treatment, which could include an ability to benefit from and pay for the treatment.
3.

The Supreme Court's ruling in Bowen v. American
Hospital Association

Rather than ruling on the principal issue in University Hospital the meaning of the term "otherwise qualified" and whether that term
bars application of section 504 to medical treatment decisions - the
Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hospital Association 119 held on a
narrow procedural issue, finding that there was not a proper evidentiary
basis for the HHS rulemaking. 120 The Court struck down the HHS regulations and declined to examine the scope of section 504 in treatment
decisions involving handicapped infants.
The plurality opinion 121 stated that there was no statutory discrimination because the administrative record compiled by HHS consisted ex117. Id. at 1050.
118. The University Hospital panel would agree with the Baylor court regarding access to
the hospital. See United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at
Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). The University Hospital court stated that
section 504 was passed in order to "[guarantee] handicapped individuals access to
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance." [d. at 159. In the view
of the University Hospital court, access to appropriate medical treatment is not required by section 504.
119. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
120. Id. at 2121. The Court found that "the administrative record does not contain the
reasoning and evidence that is necessary to sustain federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional process." Id. at 2122.
121. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by only Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justice White wrote a dissent-
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clusively of cases in which parents, not a hospital or its physicians, made
the decision to withhold treatment. 122 Section 504 did not purport to
regulate parental decisions regarding treatment. Only hospitals and their
agents were subject to regulation by section 504. Hence, the plurality
concluded that in the cases included in the administrative record, there
was no discrimination as defined in section 504. In circumstances where
treatment was withheld, absent a parental request to furnish treatment, a
handicapped infant could not be deemed "otherwise qualified" or the victim of discrimination "solely by reason of his handicap."123
Such a literalistic view of the decision-making process, that is either
the physician or the parent decides, oversimplifies what is often a complex situation. Distraught parents may turn to their pediatrician, neonatal specialists, clergy, counselors, or friends for guidance. In situations
where physicians strongly would urge the parents to choose non treatment, the plurality would find no violation of section 504, because it may
not "prevent the giving of advice to do something which section 504 does
not itself prohibit" [i.e., the parental decision not to treat]. This troubling interpretation presumes that no matter how strongly a physician
urges cessation of treatment, section 504 is inapplicable so long as the
distraught parent acquiesces in the nontreatment decision. Such a narrow view of section 504 ignores the broad remedial purpose of the Act
and congressional intent to enact an aggressive federal policy to protect
the civil rights of the handicapped. 124 Moreover, by stripping HHS of its
regulatory procedure to investigate alleged discrimination, the Court
handcuffs HHS on those occasions where certain potentially lifesaving
measures may not have been presented to the parents for their
consideration.
HHS had anticipated that a non treatment decision made by the parent would not violate section 504.125 In such cases, HHS anticipated
that the state child protective services agencies would proceed under
state statute or the parens patriae doctrine; the regulations therefore required the hospital to notify the agency of any such nontreatment. The
Supreme Court also struck down this provision, however, finding that
although the Secretary "can require state agencies to document their own
compliance with section 504, nothing in that provision authorizes him to
commandeer state agencies to enforce compliance by other recipients of
federal funds .... "126 The Court provided a restrictive interpretation of
this provision by finding that it was an attempt to do indirectly that

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

ing opinion that was joined by Justices Brennan and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist
did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
See id. at 2115 & n.18.
Id. at 2114.
See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures & Guidelines Relating
to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1621, 1627 (1984) (codified at
45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 2120.
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which might not be done directly. A more precise analysis for the regulation must be premised on an inquiry as to whether section 504 is broad
enough to require federally-assisted programs 127 to take all legal steps
under existing state law to protect handicapped infants. State agencies
are not being "commandeered" to enforce compliance with the federal
statute; rather, as beneficiaries of federally-assisted programs, these agencies merely are being directed to enforce state doctrines. Far from being
a "federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional
process," this provision evidences a respect for the necessary balance between the traditional dominant role of the states in medical treatment
issues and the emergent and widely-accepted federal role in protecting
the civil rights of the handicapped.
Justice White's dissent 128 rests on twin foundations. First, he
strongly disagrees with the University Hospital analysis and would remand to the court of appeals on that basis. Second, he disagreed with the
plurality's view that consent is granted or withheld solely by the parent:
"In fact, the doctors (directly) and the hospital (indirectly) in most cases
participate in the formulation of the final parental decision and in many
cases substantially influence that decision. Consequently, discrimination
against a handicapped infant may assume guises other than the outright
refusal to treat once parental consent has been given."129
Regarding the reliance of the lower courts on University Hospital,
the dissent found that section 504 may apply to medical treatment decisions and that the "otherwise qualified" limiting language in the statute
does not justify "the wholesale conclusion"130 that section 504 cannot
apply to handicapped infants. "That some or most failures may not fall
within section 504, that discerning which failures to treat as discriminatory may be difficult, and that applying section 504 in this area may intrude into the traditional functions of the state do not support the
categorical conclusion that the section may never be applied to medical
decisions about handicapped infants."I31
After dismissing the University Hospital analysis, Justice White
would remand the case to the court of appeals to determine the scope of
the statutory authority and to determine whether the regulations are
within that authority. He also disagreed with the Court's apparent presumption that the consent process involves a simple yes or no from the
parent:
Discrimination may occur when a doctor encourages or fails to
discourage a parental decision to refuse consent to treatment
for a handicapped child when the doctor would discourage or
127. State child protective services agencies receive funding under the Child Abuse Prevention & Treatment Act of 1974, among other sources.
128. Bowen v. American Hasp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 2123.
129. [d. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting).
130. !d. at 2127 (White, J., dissenting).
131. [d.
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actually oppose a parental decision to refuse consent to the
same treatment for a non handicapped child. Or discrimination
may occur when a doctor makes a discriminatory treatment
recommendation that the parents simply follow. Alternatively,
discrimination may result from a hospital's explicit laissez-faire
attitude about this type of discrimination on the part of
doctors. 132
If the scenarios presented in the dissent exist, section 504 would indeed
apply and discrimination may occur. The plurality, by presuming that
the parents control the decision-making process, fails to confront the
problem.
In support of his position that doctors do playa substantial role in
the decision-making process, Justice White cited a published survey of
pediatricians and pediatric surgeons that indicates that 23.6 percent of
pediatric surgeons and 13.2 percent of pediatricians would encourage
parents to refuse consent to surgery when faced with the medical
problems in the Bloomington Baby Doe case (Down's syndrome with
intestinal atresia).133 By comparison, only 7.9 percent of pediatric surgeons and 2.6 percent of pediatricians would acquiesce in parental refusal
to treat intestinal atresia in an infant with no other affliction. 134 If this
survey data is substantially accurate and if distraught parents do indeed
give weight to their doctor's advice-both reasonable assumptions-then
discrimination does occur and section 504 should apply.
The dissent also would uphold the requirement that state child protective services agencies act to protect handicapped infants. The dissent
believes that "the regulations simply track the existing state procedures
found to exist by the Secretary .... "135
Although the Supreme Court's narrow holding in Bowen v. American Hospital Association struck down the HHS rules on the basis of a
faulty administrative record, the extent to which it may otherwise allow
HHS to use section 504 on a case-by-case basis to protect handicapped
infants was left for another day. Citing Alexander v. Choate,136 the Court
did find that a hospital rule or state policy that denied "meaningful access" to handicapped infants would be subject to challenge under section
504; however, the Court did not explore the meaning of "meaningful access" in this context. The Court thus declined to rule on the potential
protective scope of section 504 when individual medical treatment decisions are involved.
132. Id. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id.; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care
for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,845, 30,848 (1983) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. § 84.55) (proposed July 5, 1983) (citing Shaw, Randolph & Manuel, Ethical
Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians & Pediatric Surgeons,
60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977».
134. Id. at 2131 (White, J., dissenting).
135.Id.
136. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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By enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and particularly section
504, Congress sought to create a broad civil rights statute to eliminate
discrimination against the handicapped in all federally-assisted programs, including health services. A future Court has been left with the
task of deciding the extent to which section 504 projects into the realm of
individual treatment decisions.
III.

THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984: THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

The storm of controversy that engulfed the interpretation of the section 504 regulations created pressure on Congress to enact further legislation protecting handicapped infants. The continued criticism of early
federal investigatory and enforcement actions, however, spelled trouble
for any solution that broadened the federal role within the context of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.137 Consequently, advocates for handicapped
infants proposed that Congress amend the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 138 (hereinafter the "1974 Act") to require that
states, as a condition of receiving federal monies for child abuse programs, establish programs and procedures within their child protective
services systems designed to prevent the withholding of medical treatment from handicapped infants. Legislation amending the 1974 Act was
intended to supplement, rather than to supplant, federal activity under
section 504.139
As introduced in 1984, the House bill to amend the 1974 Act contained three major amendments relating to the treatment of handicapped
infants. First, each state would be required to develop procedures to ensure that nutrition, medical treatment, general care, and appropriate social services were being provided to infants with life-threatening
congenital impairments. l40 The federal government was to assist the
states in developing procedures. 141 Second, each state would be required
to establish procedures that would enable any individual to report the
denial of treatment to or care for a handicapped infant. 142 Third, the
failure to satisfy either the first or second requirement would result in the
loss of federal grant monies under the 1974 Act. 143
137. For Congressional proponents of the rights of handicapped infants to press for
amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, while HHS contemporaneously was litigating the applicability of the Act to Infant Doe situations, would have been tantamount to admitting that section 504 did not apply to Infant Doe cases.
138. 42 U.S.c. §§ 5101-5106 (1974).
139. Both the Senate and House bills were amended in committee to state: "No provision
in this Act may be so construed as to limit or lessen any right or protection under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."
140. H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONGo REC. 390, 391 (daily ed. Feb. 2,1984).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. [d.
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The meaning of "medically indicated treatment"

The original text of the House bill, although requiring that medically indicated treatment be provided to handicapped infants, neglected
to define this phrase. The omission of a definition led to charges during
the House floor debate that medically indicated treatment could be interpreted to require intrusive governmental inquiries when death was imminent and irreversible. 144 Representative Chandler, a leading opponent of
the legislation, observed that "medically indicated treatment" is a broad
phrase and expressed his concern that, without Congressional definition,
courts would continue to disagree about its application. 145 In addition,
Representative Chandler stated his concern that "one person's medically
indicated treatment is another person's futile gesture .... "146 The criticism that the legislation to amend the 1974 Act would require physicians
and other members of a hospital staff to undertake heroic actions to postpone imminent death recurred throughout the House debate. 147
144. 130 CONGo REC. H390 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Thomas) ("The
transfer of decisionmaking regarding medical treatment of the infant from the medical team to federal bureaucrats must not be allowed."); 130 CONGo REC. H398
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Ferraro) ("Are we really going to add to
the grief and torment of a young couple, whose hopes and prayers for a healthy
baby have been shattered, the burden of complying with that ill-advised intrusion of
federal law?"); 130 CONGo REC. H398-400 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Miller):
I only wish every member could listen to the doctors describing the parents coming back to the hospital in the middle of the night, sitting at the
side of the child that is in the intensive care unit ... and making a decision
whether it is going to be conservative medical treatment, ordinary medical
treatment or heroic efforts. . .. [B]ecause someone determines they are an
interested party they will sue under this statute ... or a district attorney
with political ambitions will determine he is an interested party and now
that family is on display.
145. 130 CONGo REC. H384 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Chandler).
146. Id.
147. 130 CONGo REC. H384 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Chandler):
It would appear that the goal of some who advocate State control of decisions concerning at-risk infants take the view that, regardless of consequences, the lives of all infants should be maintained if it is technically
feasible to do so. This raises the moral question of whether it is more
correct to keep a seriously ill child in suffering or to allow nature to take
its merciful course. In many cases the issue is not whether the child will
die, but when.
130 CONGo REC. H389 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984 (statement of Rep. Hall) ("[C]hild
abuse includes cases where extraordinary life support measures are terminated for
terminally handicapped infants. Surely, the parents of an infant with terminal congenital impairments who have agonized over the painful decision to stop the prolonged agony of their child are not child abusers."); 130 CONGo REC. H390 (daily
ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Thomas) ("[I]t must be recognized that despite
... the increasing advances in medical technology not all infants can be saved.
Extraordinary life saving measures in these instances result in inappropriate and
often painful treatment unnecessarily prolonging the dying process."); 130 CONGo
REC. H396 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("Physicians and
parents ... will be forced to prolong even those severe cases that everyone would
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Although proponents of the 1984 bill repeatedly stated that their
intent was not to intervene when death was imminent, the controversy
continued. After an amendment to the measure, proposed by Representative Chandler, that would have provided guidelines for hospitals to create
local review committees, rather than force states to adopt and enforce
regulations to protect handicapped infants, was defeated by a vote of 182
to 231,148 the original measure was passed by the House by a vote of 396
to 4 and sent to the Senate. 149 The controversy caused the bill to be
sidetracked in the Senate for more than a year. ISO A compromise definition of medically indicated treatment ultimately was agreed to by the
Senate and ensured that heroic measures were not required to prolong
agree are only hopeless pain.");130 CONGo REC. H397 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Quillen):
The newborn, if he or she is suffering to the point of death and they have
to call the regional office or call Washington, D.C., and say, "Get a man
on a plane down here to this hospital and tell us what we should do," and
in the meantime this infant, this severely handicapped individual, could
die before the bureaucrats can act. Is this the next step? I think it is a
mistake that we should have legislation to direct us in that vein.
130 CONGo REC. H398 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rowland):
Many doctors now feel in jeopardy with people who are severely handicapped, possibly because of brain death and are being kept alive on extraordinary life support systems, they are fearful of what might take place
and being brought into court. I see exactly the same thing happening
under this particular situation.
130 CONGo REC. H400 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Miller):
These families ... [which believed] that the best of all worlds was going to
be visited upon them in a healthy, normal, wonderful bouncy child, and
then to find out that no skull existed, to find out that the intestines were
outside the body, to find out that the child ... is going to die within a year
. . . and then to find out that somebody . . . hauls you off to court to
second-guess every medical decision you made.
148. 130 CONGo REc. H401 (dailyed. Feb. 2, 1984). The amendment proposed by Representative Chandler setting forth guidelines for hospitals to create local review
committees provided:
Sec. 108(a). The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall by
regulations establish guidelines for advisory committees to provide advice
to hospitals that provide care for seriously ill newborns and to the physicians and families using the hospitals respecting the care and treatment of
seriously ill newborns and to (1) provide advice when the decisions are being considered to withhold or withdraw from such newborns life sustaining medical or surgical
treatment; and
(2) recommend institutional policies concerning the withholding or
withdrawal of medical or surgical treatment to such newborns.
The guidelines shall provide that such advisory committees should
include representatives of the medical, nursing, and other health care professions, providers of social services, hospitals, organizations which represent the disabled, and persons with training in ethics or theology.
149. 130 CONGo REC. H423 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984).
150. The Senate bill was approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee in May 1983, but was not brought up on the Senate floor until July 1984. The
bill passed on July 26, 1984, by a vote of 89-0.
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the lives of terminally ill infants.151 As a result, the Senate bill incorporating specifically enunciated limited exceptions to the phrase "medically
indicated" treatment was approved without dissent. 152 The Conference
Report, which essentially adopted the Senate version, was approved by
the House on September 26, 1984,153 and by the Senate on September 28,
1984. 154
The definition of medically indicated treatment contained in the enactment provides for three circumstances where treatment, other than
nutrition, hydration, and medication, is not considered medically indicated.155 First, treatment is not medically indicated where the infant is
chronically and irreversibly comatose.1 56 Second, when treatment
merely would prolong dying and would not be effective in ameliorating
or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or would be
otherwise futile in terms of the infant's survival, then such treatment is
not deemed medically indicated. 157 Third, treatment that would be virtually futile in terms of the infant's survival and that under the circumstances would be inhumane is not medically indicated. 158

B.

When treatment will be "futile" or "virtually futile and inhumane"

Because the definition of medically indicated treatment was developed following the completion of congressional hearings, committee reports, and action by the House of Representatives, there is little
legislative history concerning the phrase. The available legislative history establishes the existence of a substantial consensus that treatment
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
130 CONGo REC. S9328 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
130 CONGo REC. HIO,327-39 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984).
130 CONGo REC. S12,382-92 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984).
Even the bill's critics deplored the starvation of infants, such as Infant Doe, in
Bloomington, Indiana. "That was an outrageous situation repugnant to every
Member of this House." 130 CONGo REC. H400 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Miller).
156. The complete definition of medically indicated treatment follows:
[T]he term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing
treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication)
which, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all
such conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or physicians'
reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly
comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong
dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself
under such circumstances would be inhumane.
42 U.S.c. § 5102 (1984).
157. /d.
158. Jd.
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that would merely prolong dying, treatment that would not ameliorate or
correct all life-threatening conditions, and treatment of a chronically and
irreversibly comatose infant should not be required. 159 The legislative
history, however, is silent as to the definition of the terms "futile," "virtually futile," and "inhumane." The legislative silence is complicated
further by the clear intention of the sponsors and supporters of the 1974
Act that "quality of life" not be considered in treatment decisions. 160 As
a result, there is the potential for varying interpretations of the amendment as hospitals and physicians attempt to determine when medically
indicated treatment actually is required.
The only time that the issue of futile, virtually futile, and inhumane
treatment was explained during the congressional debate occurred when
Senator Nickles, one of the Act's principal sponsors, stated that Congress
was attempting to address gray areas. 161 Senator Nickles noted:
These are the cases when the child has a very slim chance for
survival and the physician must make a judgment call as to
whether the odds of correcting the child's condition are strong
enough to merit an attempt to save the baby, even with treatment that may be very painful. This provision ... gives a physician the leeway needed to make such a judgment call without
159. 130

REC. H384 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn):
There is no requirement in this legislation, and we have made it very clear,
not only in the legislation but in the supporting reports and our colloquy
here on the fioor, there is no intention to require futile treatment to prolong when there is no chance for a successful recovery of the child.
Id.; 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nickles):
[T]he amendment to S1OO3 provides a carefully crafted definition of the
phrase "withholding of medically indicated treatment" to guide states in
carrying out the provisions of this act ....
CONGo

First, it does not require unending treatment of an infant which is doomed
to die regardless of what is done. . . . Second, if a child is born with more
than one anomaly, and one or several are correctable with treatment, but
the child has some condition which is fatal and untreatable, then the physician is not being mandated to take the infant through repeated surgeries
for the correctable condition(s). Third, the language does not apply to
children in comas.
Finally, the last exception allows for the so-called gray areas. These are
the cases when the child has a very slim chance for survival and the physician must make a judgment call as to whether the odds of correcting the
child's condition are strong enough to save the baby, even with treatment
that may be very painful.
160. 130 CONGo REC. S9323 (daily ed. July 26,1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("We
must never allow a mind-set that arbitrarily determines the 'quality of life' another
mayor may not have."); 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Nickles) ("Our Nation has come too far in the mainstreaming of persons
with disabilities into all aspects of society to sanction a quality of life ethic in which
only those who are fit or productive or functioning members of society are allowed
to live."); 130 CONGo REC. S9327 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Jepsen) ("We cannot destroy life just because the life does not meet our specifications
nor can we judge the quality of life. ").
161. 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
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fear of violating the letter or spirit of this legislation. 162
The Nickles formulation leads to the conclusion that in situations when
the infant might not be dying, Congress was unwilling to require extensive and perhaps painful treatment unless the physician believed there
was a substantial possibility of improving or correcting the child's condition through treatment.
A statement of principles issued by a coalition of medical associations and advocacy groups for the disabled, which was the basis for the
congressional consensus on the meaning of medically indicated treatment, supports Senator Nickles' formulation. 163 This document states the
coalition's view that Congress should err, if at all, on the side of
treatment:

In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be
beneficial, a person's disability must not be the basis for a decision to withhold treatment. At all times during the process
when decisions are being made about the benefit or futility of
medical treatment, the person should be cared for in the medically most appropriate ways. When doubt exists at any time
about whether to treat, a presumption always should be in
favor of treatment. 164
The coalition took the position that doctors have the leeway necessary to determine whether the treatment will be futile or virtually futile
when the underlying disability, distinct from the condition to be treated,
162. Id.
163. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160-61 (1984); see also 73 PEDIATRICS 559 (April, 1984).
164. The full statement, entitled Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants, specifies
when medical treatment should be provided:
When medical care is clearly beneficial, it should always be provided.
When appropriate medical care is not available, arrangements should be
made to transfer the infant to an appropriate medical facility. Considerations such as anticipated or actual limited potential of an individual and
present or future lack of available community resources are irrelevant and
must not determine the decisions concerning medical care. The individual's medical condition should be the sole focus of the decision. These are
very strict standards.
It is ethically and legally justified to withhold medical or surgical procedures which are clearly futile and wiIl only prolong the act of dying. However, supportive care should be provided, including sustenance as
medically indicated and relief of pain and suffering. The needs of the dying person should be respected. The family also should be supported in its
grieving.
In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be beneficial,
a person's disability must not be the basis for a decision to withhold treatment. At all times during the process when decisions are being made
about the benefit or futility of medical treatment, the person should be
cared for in the medically most appropriate ways. When doubt exists at
any time about whether to treat, a presumption always should be in favor
of treatment.
49 Fed. Reg. 48,160-61 (1984).
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will not be the basis for a decision to withhold treatment. 165 For example, surgery to repair a blocked esophogus cannot be refused because the
child has Down's syndrome. In addition, when the disability and the
condition to be treated are indistinguishable, such as surgery to close the
back of a spina bifida infant, the decision must be made on the basis of
whether the surgeon believes the operation will be beneficial to the infant
or will be futile, rather than on the basis of the quality of life of spina
bifida children generally or of that infant in particular. '66 In other
words, the condition to be treated, and not the predicted consequences or
effects of the underlying disability, must be the basis for the treatment
decision.
The interpretive guidelines accompanying the HHS rule implementing this Act also shed light on Congressional intent that treatment not be
required if it "would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane." 167 The guidelines state that virtually futile treatment is treatment that "is highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future."168
Treatment is inhumane if "the treatment itself involves significant medical contraindications and/or significant pain and suffering for the infant
that clearly outweigh the very slight potential benefit of the treatment for
an infant highly unlikely to survive."169 The guidelines note that the
statutory definition for these terms
recognizes that in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment,
there are situations where, although there is some slight chance
that the treatment will be beneficial to the patient (the potential
treatment is considered virtually futile, rather than futile), the
potential benefit is so outweighed by negative factors relating to
the process of the treatment itself that, under the circumstances, it would be inhumane to subject the patient to the
treatment. 170
C.

Infant Care Review Committees

The enactment recommends the establishment of ICRCs within
each health care facilityP' Such ICRCs originally were proposed by
165. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
166. See also HHS Interpretive Guidelines on the Child Abuse Amendments, 50 Fed.
Reg. 14,892 (1985) (to be codified as an Appendix to 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340) ("A
number of commenters argued that the [Department's] interpretation should permit, as part of the evaluation whether treatment would be inhumane, consideration
of the infant's future 'quality of life.' The Department strongly believes such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute.").
167. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
168. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,892 (1985) (to be codified as an Appendix to 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340).
169. [d.
170. [d.
171. The enactment contains a provision calling for interim model guidelines to encourage the creation of ICRCs:
Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secre-
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medical groups and opponents of the 1984 amendments as a substitute
for state and local involvement in the treatment decision-making process. 172 The HHS Model Guidelines for the ICRCs,173 published in conjunction with the final rule and closely paralleling the earlier HHS
Guidelines for ICRCs under section 504, clearly envision that these hospital review committees would work in coordination with, rather than
replace, the state child protection services agencies.
IV.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

Substantive due process: the right to privacy versus the right to life

Due process of law is guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 174 The fifth amendment due
process clause 175 protects persons from Federal action that violates certain individual rights, whereas the fourteenth amendment clause 176 prevents similar encroachments by state governments. \77 At a threshold

172.
173.
174.

175.
176.
177.

tary shall publish interim model guidelines to encourage the establishment
within health-care facilities of committees which would serve the purposes
of educating hospital personnel and families of disabled infants with lifethreatening conditions, recommending institutional policies and guidelines
concerning the withholding of medically indicated treatment . . . from
such infants, and offering counsel and review in cases involving disabled
infants with life-threatening conditions.
42 U.S.c. § 5103 (1984); see also Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to
Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893-14,901 (1985)
(model guidelines as required by 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (1984).
A House floor amendment to accomplish this purpose was offered by Representatives Chandler and Waxman. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 182 to 231.
See 130 CONGo REC. H392-401 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984).
50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985).
Equal protection issues may arise in Infant Doe cases where the class of handicapped infants is treated different from a similarly situated class of nonhandicapped
infants. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (infant treated different from fetus);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (infant treated different from adult); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (infant
treated different from mentally retarded elderly person). Equal protection considerations, however, have not yet arisen in the reported Infant Doe cases and therefore
are beyond the scope of this article.
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CaNST. amend. V.
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-59 (1973) (stating that the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment protects a woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy from state action). The threshold constitutional issue in Infant Doe cases
is whether state action is present when a severely handicapped infant under care in a
private hospital is taken off all life support systems. Arguably, a court could find
state action based on the acceptance of government funding by a hospital. Cf Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (holding that the city of Montgomery had subsidized a racially discriminatory practice by granting exclusive use
of public facilities to racially segregated groups); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973) (invalidating book subsidy to students attending racially discriminating
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level, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
guarantee each person due process when governmental action impairs
that person's life, liberty, or property. 178 In addition, the Supreme Court
has held that due process scrutiny is required where there are allegations
by citizens that the government has violated certain of their fundamental
rights. 179 The earliest fundamental rights cases involved state infringement on certain personal and intra-family matters. 180 More recently, the
Court has recognized a fundamental right of privacy, which is particularly strong in cases involving marriage, conception, pregnancy, and
child bearing. 181 In cases where the issue is whether governmental action
violates a fundamental right, the government must show a compelling
interest that justifies its action. 182

178.
179.

180.

181.

182.

schools). But cf Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that adjustment
by state to patients' Medicaid benefits following discharge or transfer from nursing
home did not constitute state action). A court also may find state action where a
hospital uses judicial process to order a particular type of medical treatment or
prohibit a particular medical treatment decision. Cf Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (holding unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment a court
order upholding a racially discriminatory covenant that barred sales of properties to
racial minorities). For example, such a situation may arise where a hospital secures
a court order permitting the transfusion of blood into a Jehovah's Witness.
See supra notes 139, 140.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (interstate travel); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (association).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation is a fundamental right);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (finding a fundamental right of
parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children"); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men .... ").
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("[T]he teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
from unjustified intrusion by the State."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
("The right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual
... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (requirement that divorce action be brought in
court with no right to a waiver of costs violated due process right of those who were
unable to pay court costs); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating laws
prohibiting interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
(invalidating a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives; "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. . .. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (banning prosecution
for possessing obscene materials in the home).
Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)) ("[W]here fundamental personal liberties are involved,
they may not be abridged ... simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has
some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. 'Where
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Infant Doe cases present a due process dilemma between the parents' assertion of a privacy interest when making medical treatment decisions for the infant coupled with the parents' assertion of their own
privacy interest in intra-family decisions and the state's interest in protecting the infant's life. Encroachment on the infant's or the parents'
privacy interests by the state may require the state to demonstrate a compelling government interest. 183 Although the Supreme Court has held
that a state has a compelling interest in protecting the lives of all its
citizens, some courts have found the state's interest to be less than compelling where handicapped infants are involved. 184
It has long been recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in
the lives of infants. The state's interest is rooted in the common law
doctrine of parens patriae, 185 in state statutes,186 and in the United States
Constitution. 187 States have been permitted to intervene in medical treatment decisions to protect the interests of individuals,188 particularly
when the individuals are children. 189

183.
184.
185.

186.

187.
188.

189.

there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.' "). See also J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457-61 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]'
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162 ("separate and distinct" compelling state interests
"in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . and . . . in
protecting the potentiality for human life").
See infra notes 215-37 and accompanying text.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("Acting to guard the
general interest in youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control . . . . Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent
grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience."); In re Welcher, 243 N. W.2d 841 (Iowa) (1976) (the state, as parens patriae, has the duty to see that every child within its borders receives proper care and
treatment).
See discussion of various state civil and criminal statutes in Baumgardner, Defective
Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles Emphasized by the Infant
Doe Case, 14 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 569 (1983).
See supra notes 175, 176.
See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (blood transfusions ordered for mother of minor
child over mother's religious objections); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
576,279 A.2d 670 (1971) (the state has a compelling interest in the life of an unconscious 22-year-old woman who requires transfusions despite her mother's religious
objections); In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1974) (extensive
surgery authorized for severely retarded 22-year-old, where surgery might enable
him to live a more normal life outside of an institution).
See, e.g., In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (14-year-old with epileptic
seizures whose parents refused treatment on religious grounds was adjudged "dependent and neglected," despite statute prohibiting a finding of neglect if the child is
"under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer"); People ex rei. Wallace
v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (doctrine
of parens patriae required state to order transfusion for minor child over parents'
religious objections); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978)
(court ordered treatment for two year old child with leukemia over parents' objections, finding that the state's interest in protecting the life of the child always out-
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Some state courts have addressed the conflict between the interests
of handicapped children, their parents, and the state, and have found the
state's assertion of the child's right to life to be paramount. In the case of
In re Cicero, 190 an infant was born with Meningomyelocele, a spinal birth
defect. Failure to surgically repair the defect within forty-eight hours
was likely to result in further complications and death. 191 Initially, the
infant's father consented to surgery; however, the father subsequently
withdrew his approval - apparently when the infant's physicians explained the potential extent of the disorder. 192 Because both parents refused to permit medical treatment, the hospital's chief executive officer
petitioned the court to be appointed guardian of the infant for the sole
purpose of consenting to surgery. 193 The New York Supreme Court held
that the doctrine of parens patriae and the state child neglect statute provided sufficient basis for ordering surgery on the infant. 194 The court reasoned that where the medical prognosis for an infant is that of a useful
life, courts will not permit parental inaction to impair the prognosis. 195
The court rejected the argument that the parental right to make decisions
concerning the treatment, upbringing, and welfare of the infant exceeded
the state's interest in the infant's life. 196 The court specifically noted,
however, that the infant's handicapping condition was not severe enough
to condemn the infant to "an existence which cannot be a life."197
Other state courts, however, have found the privacy right paramount to the state's interest when the infant's prospects for recovery are
minimal, finding that the state's interest in protecting life falls below the
threshold of compelling when the infant is terminally ill or irreversibly
comatose. Thus, according to these courts, the state's interest in protecting the lives of critically ill infant patients varies with the prognosis of
each infant.

190.
191.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

weighs the parental interests); In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981)
(court ordered treatment for child with hydrocephalus who faced potentially severe
brain damage over parents' religious objections); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (cancer treatment ordered for 12-year-old over father's religious objections where treatment would increase possibility of survival); Mitchell v.
Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (the state's interest in the welfare of
its citizens permitted it to take custody of a sick child whose mother rejected orthodox medical treatment in favor of home remedies and prayer). See also Brown &
Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 615, 632 (1976)
(citing an unpublished Detroit case where surgery was ordered to correct an intestinal blockage of a Down's syndrome infant).
101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 700,421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
Id. at 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
Id. at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
Id.
Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
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The Substituted Judgment Doctrine: The Quinlan line of cases

The seminal decision employing the majority approach was In re
Quinlan. 198 The Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted the removal of
all life-support systems from twenty-two year old Karen Ann Quinlan.
Although Quinlan was in a coma, she did retain limited neurological
functions. 199 The Quinlan court reasoned that an individual's privacy
right does not terminate because the individual is unconscious and therefore unable to exercise it. 200 The court then applied the doctrine of substituted judgment by further reasoning that Quinlan'S father could
exercise her right of privacy by using his best judgment to select the
course of medical treatment that his daughter would have chosen had she
been competent to make decisions. 201 The court declared that the state
has no compelling interest in requiring a person in Quinlan'S condition
"to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life."202
The Quinlan court balanced the individual's privacy interest against
the state's interest in protecting life and utilized the prognosis for the
patient and the nature of the required medical treatment as dispositive
factors. The court reasoned that the state's interest decreases and the
individual's right to privacy increases as the degree of bodily invasion
necessary to effect the required medical treatment increases and the patient's prognosis diminishes. Ultimately, there is a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the state's interest.203 The Quinlan court
also approved formation of hospital ethics committees, composed of physicians, social workers, attorneys, and theologians,204 which function
much like the HHS Infant Care Review Committee,205 recommending
and approving treatment decisions.
The Quinlan analysis has been followed widely in recent years. 206
198. 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger V. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
199. [d. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
200. [d. ("If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of
privacy ... then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition
prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.")
201. [d. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664. The court did not allow Mr. Quinlan to assert his own
privacy right to determine the care of his 22-year-old daughter, but noted in dicta
that such a parental right would exist if the child were an infant. [d.
202. [d. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
203. [d. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court distinguished the case before it from cases
where blood transfusions had been ordered by noting that a transfusion is a "minimal bodily invasion" and that in such cases the chances of recovery are generally
good. /d.
204. /d. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
205. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
206. Cases citing Quinlan and finding the patient's right of privacy paramount include:
Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985) (competent, terminally-ill 71-year-old may refuse life support); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127,482 A.2d 713 (1984) (42-year-old's prognosis
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In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,207 a sixty-seven year old
mentally retarded man with an intelligence quotient of ten and a mental
age of three was diagnosed as having leukemia. 208 The patient's physician recommended that the man undergo chemotherapy.209 The patient's guardian objected to chemotherpy treatment because of its adverse
was so poor that the state had no interest in preventing termination of treatment);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (husband of
comatose woman may invoke her constitutional privacy right and petition court for
order authorizing removal of life support); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 370 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (mentally alert, but terminally-ill adult has constitutional privacy right permitting him to refuse all treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977) (guardian of incompetent, terminally-ill cancer patient can refuse chemotherapy, where evidence showed that patient, if competent, would have elected not to
take chemotherapy); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978)
(when elderly patient was in a vegetative state, and terminally and irreversibly ill, a
course of medical treatment excluding attempts at resuscitation in event of cardiac
arrest was proper); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (state has no compelling interest in life of comatose adult; life support may be removed); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (privacy right of 72-year-old with
gangrenous legs who refused amputation superceded state's interest in preservation
of life due to the extensive bodily invasion involved in surgery); Suenram v. Society
of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977) (right of terminally-ill,
elderly cancer patient to reject coventional treatment in favor of laetrile is of the
most fundamental nature and state's interest was not compelling); In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)
(authorizing guardian of 83-year-old comatose and terminally-ill cancer patient to
discontinue respirator where the patient had consistently expressed the desire not to
have his life prolonged by medical means); In re Jones, 107 Misc.2d 290, 433
N. Y.S.2d 984 (1980) (permissible for sister of patient to terminate life support when
patient is brain dead); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426
N.E.2d 809 (1980) (using clear and convincing evidentiary standard, court allowed
guardian to remove life support for terminally-ill patient who, if competent, would
have elected removal); In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984)
(state's interest in preserving life would not require surgery, as opposed to radiation
treatment, for 66-year-old cancer patient); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d
738 (1983) (husband of woman in chronic vegetative state allowed to terminate life
support).
Cases citing Quinlan which did not permit termination of medical treatment
include: In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (court refused request for removal of
nose tube from elderly patient since the bodily invasion from the tube was slight,
and the resultant death by starvation and dehydration would be painful); In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (ordering continuation of blood transfusions for terminally-ill, profoundly retarded adult cancer patient, where transfusions did not cause excessive pain and allowed patient to
function at his usual level of mental and physical activity); State ex rei. White v.
Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (state's interest in life superceded hunger striking prisoner's privacy interest). See also In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372
A.2d 360 (1977) (where patient is mentally incapable of consenting to amputation of
gangrenous foot, guardian may give such consent).
207. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The case was argued on July 2, 1976.
Saikewicz died on September 4, 1976, and the case was decided on November 28,
1977.
208. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
209. Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
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side effects and ineffectiveness in curing leukemia patients. 210 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the doctrine of substituted judgment to permit a court appointed guardian ad litem to exercise
the incompetent patient's privacy right to refuse chemotherapy treatment.2 11 The court elaborated on the nature of the state interest that
opposed the individual's privacy right to refuse treatment, finding four
issues in which the state had a legitimate concern: (1) the preservation of
life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the
prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of
the medical profession. 212 The Saikewicz court, however, rejected the
concept of using hospital ethics committees to approve decisions to withhold medical treatment. 213 Saikewicz merely requires judicial approval
prior to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from
an incompetent, in order to avoid civil and criminalliability.214
Recently, three states have followed Quinlan in situations involving
severely handicapped children. In In re P. V. W.,215 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana upheld a state statute providing parents and physicians with
the right to discontinue life-support systems and other medical treatment
when a child is in a profound comatose condition and there is no reasonable medical possibility of recovery.216 The court determined "that a
210. Id.
211. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431. ("In short, the decision in cases such as this should
be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual
as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process
of the competent person.")
212. 373 Mass. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
213. Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. ("We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the
ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly established courts of
proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent.")
214. In a subsequent case, In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clarified that judicial intervention was not
necessary when "brain death" had occurred, and that in each individual case "a
variety of circumstances" should be considered before deciding whether judicial intervention is necessary.
Among [the circumstances] are at least the following: the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the patient is in the custody
of a State institution, the prognosis without the proposed treatment, the
prognosis with the proposed treatment, the complexity, risk, and novelty
of the proposed treatment, its possible side effects, the patient's level of
understanding and probable reaction, the urgency of decision, the consent
of the patient, spouse, or guardian, the good faith of those who participate
in the decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medical practice, the interests of third persons, and the administrative requirements of any institution involved. We are not called upon [in this case] to
decide what combination of circumstances makes prior court approval
necessary or desirable ....
Id. at 637, 405 N.E.2d at 121.
215. 424 So. 2d 10 15 (La. 1982).
216. Id. at 1020. The statute prohibited the denial or deprivation of food, water, and
oxygen in all cases, and stated that the child's predicted quality of life could not be
considered in deciding upon the course of medical treatment. See id. at 1019.
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permanently comatose child has an independent right to discontinuance
of artificially sustained life through the mechanical invasion of the child's
body"217 and that this right may be asserted on the child's behalf by an
appropriate representative. 218
In In re Guardianship of Barry,219 an infant was born severely handicapped with a life expectancy of approximately two years. 220 The infant
lacked ninety percent of his brain function, but was not legally brain
dead. 221 As a result of this permanent and medically irreversible condition, the infant's parents acting as legal guardians requested the trial
court to approve the discontinuance and removal of a ventilator life-support system. 222 The infant's three attending physicians and a guardian
ad litem appointed by the trial court concurred with the parents' decision. 223 The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
order authorizing the discontinuance and removal of the ventilator. The
court allowed the parents to assert the infant's privacy right and utilized
the substituted judgment rationale from Quinlan to find that the infant, if
competent, would exercise his judgment to terminate the life-support system.224 The court noted that although the substituted judgment doctrine
is difficult to apply to infants who have never expressed opinions and
wishes that could guide the parents' decisions, the court would abide by
parental decisions supported by competent medical evidence. 225 Finally,
the court refused to require judicial review prior to the termination of
life-support systems, reasoning that these decisions traditionally were
made in private by the family based upon medical and religious advice. 226
In In re L.H.R. ,227 an infant, who had a normal birth, suffered a
tragic "medical catastrophe" fifteen days after birth.228 Eighty-five to
ninety percent of the infant's brain tissue was destroyed, leaving the infant in a chronic vegetative state with no cognitive functions. 229 The infant's parents, physician, guardian ad litem, and an ICRC convened by
the hospital agreed that the infant should be removed from life-support
equipment. 23o The hospital sought declaratory relief before granting the
parents' and guardian ad litem's request to disconnect the life-support
systems. 231 Removal of life-support systems was authorized by the trial
217. Id. at 1020.
218.Id.
219. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
220. Id. at 368.
221. !d.
222. Id. at 367.
223. Id. at 367-68.
224. !d. at 372.
225. Id. at 371.
226.Id.
227. In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
228. !d. at 439, 321 S.E.2d at 718.
229. !d.
230.Id.
231. Id.

484

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

court, and the infant died within thirty minutes after removal. 232
Although the infant died, the ~upreme Court of Georgia granted
review on the ground that the situation was among those cases capable of
repetition, yet evading review. 233 The Supreme Court of Georgia held
that parents may assert an infant's privacy rights on his behalf. 234 The
court reasoned that although "the state has an interest in the prolongation of life, the state has no interest in the prolongation of dying."235 In
re L.HR. did not involve a compelling state interest, because the court
found that the state did not have a compelling interest in protecting life
following a diagnosis by the treating physician and two disinterested physicians that the infant was terminally ill with no reasonable possibility of
regaining cognitive function. 236 In concluding that judicial review in
such cases was not necessary,237 the court reached a result clearly compatible with that reached in Quinlan.
Although state courts differ to some extent regarding the need for
ICRCs and for resort to judicial process,238 the Quinlan line of cases
demonstrates a substantial consensus on a number of legal issues. First,
these courts have held that parents can assert their infant's privacy right
through the doctrine of substituted judgment.239 Second, the infant's privacy right is of utmost importance and can only be breached in cases
where the state can show a compelling state interest.240 Third, a state's
interest in the lives of its citizens lessens as death becomes imminent.241
Use of the substituted judgment doctrine in Infant Doe cases represents a novel expansion of the context in which the doctrine traditionally
was applied. The substituted judgment doctrine evolved as courts attempted to ascertain the wishes of unconscious or incompetent adult patients regarding their future courses of medical treatment. The doctrine
requires a court to "don the mental mantle of the incompetent"242 and to
examine the opinions, beliefs, and statements of each patient to determine what course of treatment that patient would choose. According to
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: "[A court should] ascertain
the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences." 243
232.Id.
233.Id.
234. Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d 722-23 (1984).
235. Id.
236. /d.
237. Id. The court also noted that although consultation with an ICRC was encouraged,
it was not necessary in such cases.
238. Compare Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976) (discussing favorably the
concept of an ICRC as a tool for diffusing decision-making responsibility) with
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (1977) (stating that the judiciary,
not an ICRC, should have ultimate decision-making authority).
239. See supra notes 198-237 and accompanying text.
240. /d.
241. /d.
242. In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 839-40, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369-70 (1984)(citing In re
Carson, 39 Misc.2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (1962».
243. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.

1986]

Plight of the Handicapped Infant

485

Application of the substituted judgment doctrine in Infant Doe situations is plagued by an inherent uncertainty: the absence of a mental
mantle for the court to don. An infant has not expressed any interests or
preferences concerning medical treatment. In Infant Doe situations, the
substituted judgment doctrine is not resolved as a question of fact; instead, resolution is essentially a matter of judicial fiat.
Use of the substituted judgment doctrine also is troubling in Infant
Doe situations in which there is no general consensus within the medical
community as to the medical prognosis of the affliction. In some situations, such as those involving severe microcephaly,244 where the handicap is so severe that the medical prognosis is that the infant will never
have basic cognitive development, courts might enjoy a certain degree of
confidence in applying the substituted judgment doctrine at the parents'
request. Other circumstances, however, particularly those involving conditions such as Down's syndrome and spina bifida where the severity of
the mental and physical handicaps are not apparent during infancy, are
considerably more problematic, and the appropriateness of using the substituted judgment doctrine in these situations must be questioned.
Although the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 do not employ the
Quinlan balancing approach whereby the state's interest lessens as the
prognosis worsens, the Act should withstand constitutional scrutiny by a
court applying the Quinlan analysis. The Act expressly states that medically indicated treatment is not required when the infant is irreversibly
comatose or has no reasonable chance for survival.245 The Amendments
do not require medical treatment in situations substantially equivalent to
those situations where state courts have found that an individual's privacy right supercedes the state's interest. Likewise, the HHS rule under
section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require
futile treatment or treatment that prolongs dying. 246 Hence, the HHS
rule also passes constitutional muster under a Quinlan analysis.
2.

A comparison: Federal blood transfusion cases

Federal cases concerning blood transfusions that are objected to on
religious grounds provide an instructive analogy to Infant Doe cases. An
important decision in this area is In re President & Directors of Georgetown College. 247 In Georgetown College, a mother of a seven-month
old child was brought to the hospital by her husband for emergency
care. 248 The woman had lost a great deal of blood due to a ruptured
ulcer.249 The doctors assigned to the patient agreed that she would die
without blood transfusions; however, she had better than a fifty percent
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See supra note 58.
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying supra notes 47-51.
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
Id. at 1006.
Id.
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chance for survival if she received blood. 2sO
Based on their religious beliefs, the patient and her husband refused
to consent to blood transfusions. 2s1 Both the patient and her husband
were Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect whose doctrine opposes the
transfusion ofblood. 2s2 The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia denied the hospital's application for permission to administer blood transfusions to an emergency patient. 2s3 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and permitted attending physicians to administer blood transfusions to the patient whenever necessary to save her life. 2s4
The court found the law well-settled that courts may order compulsory medical treatment for seriously ill or injured children and also for
adults with contagious conditions. 2s5 The court held that judicial authority to order treatment was not subject to religious exceptions. 256
Moreover, the court read Prince v. Massachusetts as standing for the
principle that, despite protestations advanced on religious grounds, the
state may intervene in the family relationship to protect the child: "Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parents' control. ... Its authority is not nullified
merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course
of conduct on religion or conscience."257 The court analogized the patient's temporary lack of mental competence to make decisions regarding
her treatment to that of a child and thus found that it could intervene in
the treatment decision of the patient. 258 Finally, the court found that the
existence of the dependent child, for whom the patient had a responsibility to the community to care for, permitted the state, as parens patriae, to
intervene in the treatment decision in order to save the patient's life. 259
Since Georgetown College was decided, the majority of blood transfusion cases involving children 260 and parents of dependent children261
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

261.

Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1007-08.
Id. at 1008 (citing People ex rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(right of freedom of religion is not beyond limitation), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824
(1952».
/d. at 1008 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944».
Id.
Id.
Harley v. Oliver, 404 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King
County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 u.S. 598 (1968) (per
curiam) ; State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); Muhlenberg Hasp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974);
Crouse Irving Memorial Hasp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc.2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443
(1985) (transfusions for mother and infant during delivery).
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hasp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (pregnant woman); In re Jamaica Hasp., 128
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have permitted or ordered transfusions. On the other hand, courts generally have not required blood transfusions where a competent adult patient without dependent children objects to the procedure. 262 Three
blood transfusion cases involving children are particularly significant to
the current debate surrounding the rights of handicapped infants.
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital 263 is unusual among
blood transfusion cases. The Jehovah's Witnesses, the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, and individually named Jehovah's
Witnesses brought a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on their behalf
and as a class action on behalf of all Jehovah's Witnesses in the State of
Washington against superior court judges, juvenile court employees, state
hospitals and their employees, and physicians. 264 The plaintiffs sought a
legal declaration of their rights and a permanent injunction preventing
the defendants from administering blood transfusions to the plaintiffs in
the future against their wishes or, in the case of infants, against their
parents' wishes. 265 Each principal plaintiff asserted a right to family privacy under the ninth and fourteenth amendments. 266 In addition, individually named minor plaintiffs and their parents asserted a right to free
exercise of religion under the first amendment. 267
The three-judge federal district court denied the plaintiffs' arguments on the basis of Prince v. Massachusetts. 268 In rejecting the free
exercise of religion and family privacy arguments, the court stated that
neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. 269 The Supreme Court upheld the three-judge panel in a per curiam
decision without opinion, which cited only Prince v. Massachusetts. 27o
Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock 271 involved a mother
with an intrauterine pregnancy and other complications who was carrying an infant with hydrocephalus. The New York court held the hospital could give blood transfusions to mother and infant during and
immediately following delivery.272 In light of the authority given to all
Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (woman was 18 weeks pregnant); In re
Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc.2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1985).
262. In re Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 70S (1962).
But cf United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
263. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per
curiam).
264. Id. at 491.
265. Id. at 501.
266.Id.
267. Id. at 491. In all reported Infant Doe cases to date, it is the infant's right to privacy
which predominates rather than that of the parents.
268. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
269. Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. 488,504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam), aff'd,
390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944».
270. 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam).
271. 127 Misc. 2d 101,485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985).
272. Id. at 104, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
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physicians to carry out their duties and maintain life, the court deemed
the allowance of transfusions both proper and necessary.273 The court
specifically stated that "[e]ven when the parents' decision to decline necessary treatment is based on constitutional grounds ... it must yield to
the state's interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the health and welfare
of the child."274 By finding that, despite the infant's handicap, the state
had an overriding interest in protecting the infant's welfare,275 the court
affirmed the extent of the state's interest in every child and implicitly
rejected the Quinlan analysis that the state has a lesser interest in certain
handicapped citizens.276
In Muhlenberg Hospital v. Pauerson,277 a premature infant whose
parents were Jehovah's Witnesses required blood transfusions to prevent
severe and irreparable brain damage. 278 The court ordered blood transfusions even though the infant's life was not in immediate danger279 and
the probable result of not so ordering was serious injury rather than
death.280 The court stated that it "will continue to be the guardian of the
religious rights of the individuals to see that [the] power of the State is
not exercised beyond the area where treatment is necessary for the sustaining of life or the prevention of grievous bodily injury."281 In Muhlenberg Hospital, the state's interest in protecting the child overrode the
parent's fundamental right to refuse transfusions, even though the state's
interest in preventing injury is less than its interest in preventing loss of
life.
In the two decades since Jehovah's Witnesses was decided, the transfusion cases involving children generally have not involved claims of a
privacy right or a free exercise right by the child on his own behalf. Instead, the parents' free exercise right has been at issue. The transfusion
cases differ from the Infant Doe cases, in which the parents' assertion of
the infant's right is balanced against the state's interest in preserving the
infant's life. The blood transfusion cases involving children, however,
are instructive.
Georgetown College and its progeny are applicable in the Infant Doe
context for several reasons. First, the patient often is incompetent to
speak for himself. Second, the state has a strong interest in protecting its
citizens' lives, particularly when the infant or incompetent person cannot
make reasoned decisions. Third, and of greatest importance, the assertion of a fundamental right - the right to freely exercise one's religion
- does not override the state's interest in protecting the life of an
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

[d.
Id. at 104, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
!d. at 102, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
Id.
128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974).
!d. at 499, 320 A.2d at 519.
Id. at 500, 320 A.2d at 519.
!d.
[d. at 502, 320 A.2d at 521.
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infant. 282
Infant Doe cases mirror blood transfusion cases to the extent that
the interests involved in both types of cases fall within the broad definition of fundamental rights. The privacy interests presented in Infant Doe
cases involve parents' assertions of their right to make intra-family decisions and the infant's right to refuse medical treatment. Although the
Supreme Court requires a compelling state interest to overcome the free
exercise right to practice religion 283 and the privacy right to make intrafamily decisions,284 the Court has not determined the degree of state interest sufficient to overcome an individual's privacy right to refuse medical treatment.
3.

Substantive due process: a conclusion

An analysis of the Quinlan line of cases and the blood transfusion
line of cases in light of the Infant Doe controversy reveals two conflicting
interests. One is the privacy interest of the infant, which is asserted by
the parents. The other is the interest in the infant's life, which is asserted
by the state on behalf of the infant.
Although parents have a separate privacy interest in family decisions, this interest will not prevent the state from inquiring into their
decision-making process. The genesis of the parental privacy interest is
Prince v. Massachusetts,285 a case in which the Supreme Court acknowledged parents' right of custody, care and nurture for their child,286 but
held that the family relationship was not beyond regulation in the public
interest. 287 The Court reasoned that the state has a general interest in a
child's well being,288 which gives the state greater authority over children's activities than adult's activities. 289 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,290 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the right of the state to intervene in the
family relationship to promote state interests in the health, safety, and
general welfare of a child even though that intervention may interfere
with a fundamental right.2 91
In Infant Doe situations, the state's inquiry into the decisional process is concerned solely with determining whether the infant's health,
safety, and welfare is protected. The parental privacy interest should not
be used as a shield to block state inquiry. The trial judge in University
Hospital examined the issue of state authority to inquire into the parental decision-making process in the face of a privacy right objection, and
282. See NOWAK, supra note 182, at 448, 1053.
283. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
284. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 166.
287.Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 168.
290. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
291. Id. at 220.
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he correctly noted that the state should be permitted to ascertain whether
the parent's decision was in the infant's best interest:
It would be highly paradoxical if an individual's right to privacy could be asserted by that individual's parent or guardian,
purportedly acting in that individual's own best interests, for
the purpose of precluding an inquiry into the question of
whether the parent or guardian was in fact acting in the individual's best interest. 292

Once the inquiry regarding the treatment decision is made, attention
shifts to the parent's assertion of the infant's privacy right, and the state's
interest in the infant. The blood transfusion cases together with Prince v.
Massachusetts demonstrate that the state has a heightened interest in the
lives and welfare of infants. Although the exact extent of an infant's
privacy right has not been established, the privacy right of children is
narrower than the privacy right of adults. For example, high school students are subject to reduced fourth amendment search and seizure protections. 293 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,294 the Supreme Court
observed that the state has broader authority to regulate the conduct of
children than it does to regulate the conduct of adults 295 and that a significant state interest may overcome a minor's privacy claim. 296
In light of the heightened state interest and the reduced privacy interest for children, federal efforts to review medical treatment decisions
and to take necessary protective measures for handicapped infants are
constitutional. Courts using the Quinlan analysis, however, would review federal efforts on a case-by-case basis and likely bar the state's involvement in cases where the handicap is extreme on the theory that the
state's interest no longer supercedes the privacy interest of the child or
his parents.
B.

Procedural due process

A second due process issue presented by Infant Doe cases concerns
the procedures necessary to ensure that any infant's constitutional rights
are protected. The decision by parents and doctors to remove life-support systems or to withhold medical treatment from an infant normally
will result in death. Hence, a tenable argument can be made that the
infant will be "deprived of life in contravention of the fourteenth amend292. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 615-16 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), aff'd,
729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
293. See New Jersey v. T.L.D., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743-44 (1985) (concluding that need of
teachers and administrators for "substantial freedom" to keep order in schools justifies searches of students based on criterion of "reasonableness under the circumstances" rather than probable cause). See also Minor's Right 0/ Privacy, 8 J. Jvv. L.
435 (1984).
294. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
295. /d. at 74.
296. Id. at 75.
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ment."297 Equitable procedures therefore are necessary to ascertain
whether there is a sufficient basis for the decision to withhold or to terminate treatment. 298 Also, because some courts have found that parents are
exercising the infant's fundamental right of privacy when treatment decisions are made, any type of state involvement in the decisional process
requires a determination that the state has a compelling interest and that
state involvement is accomplished through fair procedures. 299
1.

Federal procedural requirements

The Supreme Court has not decided whether a state may authorize
the removal of life-support systems or the withholding of medical treatment from handicapped infants or individuals unable to request treatment. 300 Although the ambit of protection afforded by procedural due
process in these cases is unknown, the Supreme Court has created a tripartite test to determine the minimal constitutional protections required.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,30l a case dealing with entitlement to benefits
under the Social Security Act, the Court stated that the procedures utilized to determine the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures prior to initial termination of benefits and pending review should
be based upon a consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the interest through the procedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the governmental function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements entail. 302 The essential elements of procedural due process
which may be required after consideration of the Mathews factors include
the following: (1) adequate notice of the basis for the governmental action; (2) a neutral decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to make an oral
presentation to the decision-maker; (4) an opportunity to present evidence or witnesses to the decision-maker; (5) an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses or evidence to be used against the individual; (6) the right to have an attorney present the individual's case to the
decision-maker; and (7) a decision based on the record with a statement
of reasons for the decision. 303
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra notes 175 and 176.
See NOWAK, supra note 182, at 526.
/d. at 539.
But see supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari in In re Quinlan following state court approval of a father's
decision to remove his comatose daughter's life support system, even though the
court was unable to determine the daughter's wishes. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355
A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
301. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
302. Id. at 335. The Court cited Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), for the proposition that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands." 424 U.S. at 334.
303. See NOWAK, supra note 182, at 555-56.
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In Parham v. J.R.,304 the Supreme Court scrutinized the procedures
required for a parent to commit a minor child to a mental institution. In
Parham, the Court recognized the inherent conflict between the child's
substantial liberty interest in not being committed to a mental institution
and the parents' privacy interest in the health and welfare of the child. 305
The Court rejected the contention that the magnitude of the child's constitutional interest and the possibility of parents abusing their privilege to
commit troubled children required a formal adversarial hearing. 306 Instead, the Court found that due process was satisfied where the superintendent of the mental hospital presided over an administrative hearing in
which the child's parents retained a substantial role in the commitment
decision.307 The Court stated that "[w]hat process is constitutionally due
cannot be divorced from the ultimate decision."30s From this premise,
the Parham Court reasoned that the questions involved in decisions to
commit were essentially medical, and therefore physicians, rather than
the judiciary, should make commitment decisions.309 The Court reasoned that parents normally act in the best interests of their children and
that the law presumes parents have the maturity, experience, and capacity necessary to make commitment decisions. 310 Furthermore, the Court
found that an adversarial hearing was unnecessary on the ground, inter
alia, that when parents attempt to commit a troubled child such hearings
could exacerbate the tensions already existing in the parent-child
relationship.311
Parham requires only a fair examination of the circumstances by a
neutral decision-maker before a parent can commit a child. There are
three significant differences, however, between the facts of Parham and
situations in which handicapped infants are denied life-saving medical
treatment. These differences may affect the extent of procedural protections required. First, the magnitude of the child's interest differs.
Parham involved a temporary deprivation of liberty, whereas Infant Doe
situations involve a permanent deprivation of life. The substantially
greater interest presented by Infant Doe cases mandates more significant
due process protections under the first and second prongs of the Mathews
test. 312 Second, the nature of the state's interest differs. The Parham
304.
305.
306.
307.

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

442 U.S. 584 (1979).
!d. at 600.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 604. The Court did note, however, that "the child's rights and the nature of
the commitment decision are such that the parents cannot have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to have a child institutionalized." Id. at 604.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 610.
The Parham decision implicitly recognized the temporary nature of the commitment decision and, therefore, the ability to reverse an erroneous decision. Parham,
442 U.S. at 607 n.15 ("[W]e ... have no reason to consider at this time what
procedures for review are independently necessary to justify continuing a child's
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Court did not identify an independent state interest in protecting the
child's liberty from parental infringement. State courts, however, generally acknowledge that a state has a compelling interest in the life of a
child, especially when the child is neither comatose nor terminally ill. 3 \3
Unlike Parham, a decision to withhold medical treatment in an Infant
Doe case could permanently destroy the state's compelling interest in the
life of one of its citizens. 314 Third, the potentially negative impact of an
adversarial hearing on the parent-child relationship, as described in
Parham, is not present in an Infant Doe setting. Protective measures
greater than Parham procedures may be required by the Constitution in
Infant Doe cases.
2.

State court procedures in Infant Doe cases

At least three states currently require thorough procedures in Infant
Doe situations to guarantee that the interests of the child, the parent, and
the state are protected. The Louisiana legislature has enacted a statute
permitting a handicapped infant's physician the right to discontinue lifesupport systems and medical treatment, but not food, water, or oxygen,
when the child is comatose and has no reasonable chance for recovery. 3 15
To this statutory framework, the Louisiana Supreme Court has endorsed
additional procedural protections. These safeguards include the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the appointment of an independent physician to review the diagnosis, joinder of the state attorney general and the
local district attorney, and use of a clear and convincing evidentiary standard. 316 The Louisiana court, however, has not spelled out when judicial
action is advisable or required.
In In re Guardianship of Barry,317 a Florida trial court appointed a
guardian ad litem to represent a handicapped infant's interests in the
judicial proceedings. 318 Notwithstanding its action, the court stressed
that judicial review of parental decisions, traditionally made within the
privacy of the family relationship, is not required. 319 The court suggested, however, that any diagnosis that could result in non treatment be
confirmed by at least two physicians and that judicial review must be
available if: (1) doubt exists about whether the child has a permanent,

313.
314.

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

confinement. We merely hold that a subsequent, independent review of the patient's
condition provides a necessary check against possible arbitrariness in the initial admission decision.").
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
For example, applying the Quinlan analysis to the Bloomington Baby Doe case, a
court could find a compelling state interest that would overcome the infant's privacy
right, because the infant was neither terminally ill nor comatose. Moreover, the
surgery needed to prolong the infant's life was routine and likely to be successful.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1 C. (West Supp. 1986). See In re P.V.W., 424
So.2d 1015, 1016 (La. 1984).
424 So.2d at 1020.
445 So.2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 371.
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incurable, and irreversible condition likely to imminently result in death;
(2) there is a lack of concurrence among the family, physicians, and the
hospital; or (3) an affected party desires a judicial decree.32o Finally,
other courts were urged to adopt expedited procedures for Infant Doe
cases and to apply a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when determining whether "the child suffers from an irreversible physical or
mental defect, and there is no reasonable medical probability of the infant gaining a cognitive, sapient state."321
The Georgia Supreme Court in In re L.H.R. 322 closely paralleled the
Barry court's procedural protections by acceding to the appointment of a
guardian ad litem at the trial level and by requiring the concurrence of
two independent physicians in the diagnosis. 323 The Georgia court did
not require that either a court or an ICRC review a parental decision to
terminate treatment, but did indicate that judicial review would be available at the parties' request. 324
3.

Recommended procedures to satisfy due process

In Infant Doe cases, the compelling constitutional interests of life
and privacy and the potentially irreversible consequences of an erroneous
decision underscore the need for careful and thorough review procedures
prior to implementing a decision to terminate life-support systems or
withhold medical treatment. Although parents must retain principal responsibility for decisions regarding the well-being of their children, the
tremendous emotional, mental, and economic pressures following the
birth of a severely handicapped infant necessitate the appointment of a
neutral decision-maker to review parental decisions to ensure that they
are consistent with the child's best interests. The HHS recommendation
of ICRCs composed of individuals with no personal interest in the case
can provide this review. ICRCs should include: (1) two or more independent physicians who can review the diagnosis; (2) a guardian ad
litem or other advocate for the handicapped infant to represent the infant's interests; and (3) other individuals from outside the medical community who are independent of the administration and staff of the
involved health care facility. The state child protective services agency
or the local juvenile court could appoint the guardian ad litem or advocate. Additionally, expedited judicial review under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard must be available whenever the treating
physician or any member of the ICRC disagrees with a final decision to
terminate life-support systems or withhold treatment.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 372.
[d.
253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
[d. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 722-23.
[d. at 446-47, 321 S.E.2d at 723.
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CONCLUSION

The extraordinary difficulty inherent in Infant Doe cases is that the
very person whose interests should always control any decision regarding
treatment is silent. Parents may assert an independent privacy right in
making family decisions and the state may assert an independent interest
in protecting the lives of each of its citizens; however, in the final analysis, any judicial determination regarding treatment must be based on the
interests of the infant. In dealing with Infant Doe cases, courts must
attempt to resolve complex issues involved in the question of whether
the infant would choose to live, as asserted by the state, or would choose
to die, as asserted by the parents.
Because the infant whose life is at stake cannot speak for himself, an
administrative review mechanism must be established to monitor medical
treatment decisions. The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 establish
such a mechanism through state child protection agencies and provide
reasonable guidelines regarding implementation of extraordinary treatment measures. The rules promulgated by HHS under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 complemented the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984 by permitting the federal government to intervene quickly when
state procedures are not adequately protecting handicapped infants.
By striking down the HHS rules on procedural grounds in Bowen v.
American Hospital Association, the Supreme Court has limited the federal
protection accorded the constitutional rights of handicapped infants.
Unless HHS acts on a case-by-case basis, or Congress amends section
504, then the right of handicapped infants to receive life-sustaining treatment may not be adequately protected. Handicapped persons, regardless
of age, must possess the same rights as the nonhandicapped. Section 504
and the Child Abuse Amendments, when used together, provide an effective, prudent, and measured federal response to discrimination against
handicapped infants.

